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DISTRIBUTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS IN
THE OVERREGULATION OF HEALTH
PROFESSIONALS, HEALTH FACILITIES,
AND HEALTH PLANS
CHRISTOPHER J. CONOVER*
I
INTRODUCTION
Although an ample body of literature has focused squarely on the efficiency
implications of the web of regulations affecting health professionals and health
insurers, the issue of the distributional effects of such regulations appears to
have largely escaped the notice of scholars. This article directly addresses the
equity issue by offering some preliminary calculations of the magnitude of such
burdens and the extent to which they contribute to the distributive injustices
catalogued by Clark Havighurst and Barak Richman in this issue of Law and
Contemporary Problems.
The article begins with some general observations in Part II about how
health spending is currently distributed and what implications this has for
determining the distributional effects of health-services regulations, such as
those aimed at health professionals and health plans. Part III then focuses on
the regulation of health professionals of all types;1 Part IV examines regulation
of health facilities (predominantly hospitals and nursing homes); and Part V
discusses regulation of health plans, including conventional health insurance as
well as managed care plans. Each section explores the extent to which the
benefits and costs of such regulation may be distributed unevenly.
This article concludes that the marginal impact of health regulation is to
make the U.S. health system more, rather than less, regressive. Though current
evidence does not allow a precise estimate of the quantitative impact, it appears
that the specific regulations contributing most to distributive injustice include
continuation of coverage requirements, health insurance mandates, and
regulation of managed care (for example, patient protection).

Copyright © 2006 by Christopher J. Conover
This article is also available at http://www.law.duke.edu/journals/lcp.
* Assistant Research Professor of Public Policy Studies, Center for Health Policy, Terry Sanford
Institute of Public Policy, Duke University.
1. Of course, the reader must recognize that the lion’s share of literature in this area concentrates
on physicians; hence our picture of the ramifications of regulation of mid-level providers or other types
of health professionals may be somewhat less than complete.

08__CONOVER.DOC

3/7/2007 3:57 PM

182

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

[Vol. 69:181

II
GENERAL OBSERVATIONS
Previous work by John Holahan and Sheila Zedlewski has addressed the
general question of who pays for health care in the United States.2 This
pioneering study carefully tracked the byzantine system of health care spending3
for the nonelderly by income decile, accounting for all the major sources of
health care spending, including employer-paid health insurance premiums,
worker-paid premiums, nongroup premiums, out-of-pocket spending, Medicaid,
and uncompensated care. It then separately tracked the distribution of
financing those funding flows, detailing how each income group contributed to
the financing of Medicaid, Medicare, and the employer tax exclusion. Taking
into account both direct payments (premiums and out-of-pocket spending) and
tax payments, they found that individuals in the first income decile faced a
health-spending burden amounting to 20.5% of their income, the second decile
burden was 11.8%, and the tenth decile burden was 8.4%, as shown in Table 1.
4

Table 1: Health Care Spending as Percent of Income (1989)
st

Per Capita Income

nd

th

1 Decile

2 Decile

10 Decile

Average

1861

4328

34,525

14,311

Percent of Income
Direct Payments
Employer Premiums
Value of Tax Exclusion
Worker Premiums
Non-group Premiums
Out of Pocket

18.8%
2.1%
-0.5%
0.5%
3.2%
13.4%

9.5%
3.5%
-0.9%
1.2%
1.6%
4.2%

3.4%
2.5%
-0.9%
0.5%
0.2%
1.1%

6.1%
4.2%
-1.5%
1.0%
0.5%
1.9%

Tax Payments
Medicaid
Medicare
Employer Tax Exclusion

1.7%
0.0%
1.2%
0.5%

2.3%
0.0%
1.9%
0.5%

5.0%
1.1%
2.7%
1.3%

4.7%
0.7%
2.9%
1.1%

Total

20.5%

11.8%

8.4%

10.9%

2. See generally John Holahan & Sheila Zedlewski, Who Pays for Health Care in the United
States? Implications for Health Care Reform, 29 INQUIRY 2, 231–48 (1992) (examining health care
spending distribution).
3. The data used in this study was collected in 1989. Subsequently, the share of national health
spending that is federally financed increased from 23% in 1987 to 37% by 2004, nearly all through
higher spending from general revenues. Cynthia Smith et al., National Health Spending in 2004: Recent
Slowdown Led by Prescription Drug Spending, 25 HEALTH AFF. 186, 190 exhibit 4 (2006). On balance,
this would make today’s system somewhat more progressive than in 1989 but would not appreciably
alter the general picture painted by these authors.
4. The information in Table 1 was calculated by the author based on expenditure data reported in
Holahan & Zedlewski, supra note 2.
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67.2%

24.2%

4.1%
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8.5%

This two-and-one-half-fold difference in burdens between the bottom and
the top of the income-distribution curve confirms the general suspicions voiced
by Havighurst and Richman about the regressive nature of America’s system of
health care financing.5 However, two caveats are in order. First, if each family
actually had to fully bear the burden of its own health care expenditures, the
first decile would be spending 67.2% of their income on health care, compared
to only 4.1% for those in the tenth decile (Table 1); this admittedly is an
unrealistic hypothetical insofar as the lowest-income group would surely
massively defer, delay, or forego needed care altogether if faced with such a
stark choice. Nevertheless, it gives a feel for how much the current system—
even though it remains regressive in the aggregate—actually compresses the
extent of this regressivity (that is, taking what would otherwise be a seventeenfold differential in the hypothetical just posed and compressing this to only a
two-and-one-half-fold difference).
Second, an analysis using 1987 Consumer Expenditure Survey data showed
that the relative burden of food expenditures for poverty households compared
to those at 400% or more of poverty was 4.6 to 1; for all nonfood, nondurable
purchases, this ratio was 3.4 to 1; for shelter, it was 2.6 to 1, and for gasoline, it
was 3.3 to 1.6 In that context, a two–and-one-half-fold differential in health
spending burdens seems quite comparable to the differentials Americans
tolerate with respect to spending on other necessities of life.
To the degree that health-services regulation is simply baked into all health
spending as an add-on to the cost of both or either health services and health
insurance, then one would expect to see this two-and-one-half-fold differential
in burdens played out if an attempt were made to estimate the incidence of
regulatory costs by poverty status. However, since no one proposes dispensing
with regulation entirely, the more interesting policy question is whether the
excess costs of regulation somehow are disproportionately funneled onto those
with the lowest incomes. Put another way, would the poor disproportionately
benefit by removal of some of this regulatory excess? Policymakers surely
would like the answer to this question. What follows is a first cut at answering
it.
III
OVERREGULATING HEALTH PROFESSIONALS
A recent literature synthesis conducted for the U.S. Department of Health
and Human Services demonstrates that in the aggregate, various regulations
5. Clark C. Havighurst & Barak D. Richman, Distributive Injustice(s) in American Health Care, 69
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 7, 8 (Autumn 2006).
6. Christopher J. Conover, unpublished analysis using 1987 Consumer Expenditure Survey data
(July 25, 1991) (on file with author).
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affecting health professionals imposed a cost of $29.5 billion annually, but
conferred benefits whose value amounted to only $22.4 billion.7 Is the net
burden of $7.1 billion regressively distributed? The three largest contributors
to this net cost include Medicare graduate medical education (GME) payments
($4.3 billion), professional accreditation and licensure ($1.8 billion), and
Medicare assignment rules ($1.2 billion).8
A. Medicare GME Payments
Medicare GME payments have been used to subsidize the costs of both
direct medical education (DME) and indirect medical education (IME), such as
the added costs of care attributable to medical residents.9 Since the Balanced
Budget Act of 1997, there has been a cap on residency positions funded with
Medicare GME dollars.10 In conjunction with licensure rules that basically
preclude any physician from becoming licensed without having gone through
residency training, the combination of these policies essentially regulates the
future supply of physicians. Medicare Part A finances GME payments, and the
payroll tax used for this purpose is arguably regressive.11 On the other hand,
care provided by medical residents is almost certainly skewed to the bottom end
of the income scale,12 so if one sought to calculate the net burden of this domain
of regulation, it more likely would be slightly progressive than regressive.13
7. CHRISTOPHER J. CONOVER, CATO INSTITUTE, POLICY ANALYSIS NO. 527, HEALTH CARE
REGULATION: A $169 BILLION HIDDEN TAX 11 tbl.3 (2004), available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/
pas/pa527.pdf. Costs and benefits are reported in 2002 dollars. This analysis was specifically conducted
for the Assistant Secretary of Planning and Evaluation.
8. Id.
9. See Sean Nicholson & David Song, The Incentive Effects of the Medicare Indirect Medical
Education Policy, 20 J. HEALTH ECON. 909, 910 (2001) (discussing the purpose and use of Medicare
GME payments).
10. Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Pub. L. 105-33, § 4623, 111 Stat. 251, 274 (1997).
11. Even though the payroll tax is now essentially a “flat tax” of 2.9% on all earnings, compared to
those in the very highest income groups, low-income families rely far more heavily on such earnings, as
opposed to other sources of income such as interest income, suggesting the net effect is slightly
regressive. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., INDIVIDUAL COMPLETE REPORT (PUBLICATION 1304)
tbl.1.4 (2003) (providing data on sources of income by size of adjusted gross income), available at
http://www.irs.gov/taxstats/indtaxstats/article/0,,id=96981,00.html#_grp1.
12. I am unaware of any specific study that tracks status the services provided by medical residents
by patient income. However, Hadley and Holahan argue that at least $1.6 billion of $3.7 billion in
Medicare indirect medical education (IME) payments go to the uninsured. Jack Hadley & John
Holahan, How Much Medical Care Do the Uninsured Use, and Who Pays for It?, 2003 HEALTH AFF.
(WEB EXCLUSIVE) W3-66, W3-73 to W3-74, 76 exhibit 4. The uninsured disproportionately have low
incomes. See CARMEN DENAVAS-WALT ET AL., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, INCOME, POVERTY, AND
HEALTH
INSURANCE
COVERAGE
IN
THE
UNITED
STATES:
2004
18
tbl.7
(2005) (providing data on insurance status by income), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2005
pubs/p60-229.pdf.
13. In 1998, $5.9 billion in Medicare GME funding amounted to $76,540 per medical resident. See
Christopher J. Conover, unpublished calculation (Jan. 8, 2006) (on file with author) (based on figures
outlined in Nicholson & Song, supra note 9, at 909). In per capita terms, financing $5.9 billion in 1989
would have increased payroll taxes for the lowest two income deciles by $1.35 and $10.82 per capita,
respectively. See Christopher J. Conover, unpublished calculations (Jan. 8, 2006) (on file with author)
(based on data in Holahan & Zedlewski, supra note 2, at 240 tbl.6). Put another way, these lowest two
deciles accounted for only 2% of the entire burden of Medicare payroll taxes. But it seems reasonable
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B. Professional Accreditation and Licensure
One of the studies of health-services regulation included in the literature
synthesis was Reuben Kessel’s 1958 analysis of physician licensure, in which he
argued that American Medical Association (AMA) regulation effectively
created a monopoly that permitted physicians to earn higher-than-competitive
returns on their investments in medical education.14 This argument was echoed
by Elton Rayack in a book-length treatment of the issue a decade later.15 Even
though the political power of the AMA has dissipated rather considerably since
that period, the hours-adjusted rate of return to physicians in subsequent
decades kept rising rather than stabilizing or falling, exceeding twenty percent
for some specialties, as shown in Table 2.

16

Table 2: Rising Rates of Return to Medical
Specialization
Year

OB/GYN

General
Surgery

Internal
Medicine

1955
1965
1967
1970
1975
1980
1987

6.7
4.8
7.5
11.8
12.1
14.8
25.9

5.7
5.2
7.4
11.2
11.6
13.6
22.1

<0
1.5
8.3
9.3
12.5
9.8
12.7

More recent data show no signs these excess returns have abated. For
example, despite a sharp slowdown in the 1990s due to the widespread adoption
of managed care, the ratio of average net physician income to average earnings
of full-time wage and salary workers in the United States remained the same in
2000 (5.5) as it had been in 1985 (5.5).17 Thus, it would appear that American
physicians continue to command supra-competitive returns on their investments
in education.

to assume these two groups got at least their pro rata share of free care provided by these residents—
20%—or likely considerably more. Hence, the net effect is likely to push things in a progressive rather
than a regressive direction.
14. Reuben Kessel, Price Discrimination in Medicine, 1 J.L. & ECON. 20, 29 (1958); see Reuben
Kessel, The AMA and the Supply of Physicians, 35 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 267, 272 (Spring 1970)
(discussing the effect of regulation on educational costs and physicians’ fees).
15. See generally ELTON RAYACK, PROFESSIONAL POWER AND AMERICAN MEDICINE (1967).
16. Information in Table 2 is based on data reported in Charles Phelps, HEALTH ECONOMICS 176
tbl.6.3 (1992).
17. See KAISER FAMILY FOUND., TRENDS AND INDICATORS IN THE CHANGING HEALTH CARE
MARKETPLACE exhibit 6.4 (2002) (comparing mean income between physicians and full-time wage and
salary workers in 1985, 1996, 1998, and 2000), http://www.kff.org/insurance/7031/print-sec6.cfm.
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Yet a fair question is this: supra-competitive returns relative to what? It
turns out that physicians are not the only profession in which supra-returns are
available. The most recent available comparative data show that procedurebased, medical-doctor specialists have an hours-adjusted annual rate of return
over their working lifetime of 20.9%, while that for dentists was 20.7%; even
primary-care doctors had a return of 15.9%.18 In light of the average
profitability for U.S. corporations (5.5%),19 these are impressive rates of return.
The same study found that graduates of the top twenty business schools earned
29.0% annually on their investment in education;20 nevertheless, this
comparison may be flawed since it compares graduates of only elite business
schools to graduates of all 114 U.S. medical schools. Indeed, the study’s authors
argue that “assuming that undergraduate grade point averages accurately
predict relative performance in future careers, it may be more accurate to
compare physicians with graduates of the top law schools.”21 Their analysis
showed that law-school graduates enjoyed returns of 25.4%.22 Thus, it is not
altogether clear whether the returns to physicians truly represent “excess”
monopoly returns or are simply the returns required to prevent would-be
doctors from instead entering the legal profession. Ironically, these staggering
returns are available to lawyers despite the conventional wisdom that the
United States already has a sizable surplus of lawyers—a surplus that has been
estimated to reduce economic output by more than $1 trillion annually.23
But, assuming for the sake of argument that returns to physicians are
excessive, three additional observations are worth noting. First, it would be
difficult to tease out what component of these inflated returns can be laid at the
feet of regulation as opposed to the distortions created by the tax code in
encouraging excessive third-party coverage.24 Second, to the extent to which
regulation results in higher spending on physicians across the board, the result
generally would be regressive insofar as average utilization of physicians is not
strongly correlated with income, since any income-related propensity to spend
on physician care is apparently largely offset by the availability of public

18. William B. Weeks et al., A Comparison of the Educational Costs and Incomes of Physicians and
Other Professionals, 330 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1280, 1283 (1994).
19. Average earnings per dollar of sales for the period of October 2000 to September 2005 are
based on American Petroleum Institute calculations from data reported in various issues of Business
Week and by PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP. Oil and Natural Gas Industry Earnings Compared to All
U.S. Industry, ISSUE (Am. Petroleum Inst., Washington, D.C.), Winter 2006, at 1, available at http://apiep.api.org/filelibrary/ACF186.pdf.
20. Weeks, supra note 17, at 1284.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. James R. Garven, Moral Hazard, Adverse Selection, and Tort Liability, 28 J. INS. ISSUES 1, 9
(2005).
24. Havighurst and Richman do a thorough job explaining the connection between the tax code
and the increased demand for health care services and price insensitivity to those services. Supra note
5, at 36–39. Because physicians are among many in the health industry who earn supra-competitive
returns as a consequence of this price insensitivity, regulation simply aggravates an already regressive
situation.
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insurance and the generally worse health of the poor.25 Third, public insurance
and physician-provided free care should largely mitigate the regressive impact
this regulatory surcharge might otherwise have.26 AMA surveys show that twothirds of physicians provide uncompensated care, with such physicians
averaging 8.8 hours per week (more than fourteen percent of their time).27
Other independent surveys show the figure may be even higher;28 whatever the
actual number is, it redounds disproportionately to the benefit of patients with
the lowest incomes.
IV
OVERREGULATING HEALTH FACILITIES
The literature synthesis demonstrates that in the aggregate, various
regulations affecting health facilities imposed a cost of $47.7 billion annually,
but conferred benefits whose value amounted to only $22.6 billion.29 The $25.1
billion in net costs was accounted for largely through hospital accreditation and

25. The average number of annual physician visits in the U.S. declines as family income increases
up until $50,000, after which it increases. NAT’L CTR. FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF
HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., HEALTH, UNITED STATES 287 tbl.74 (1998), available at
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/hus/hus98ncb.pdf. However, controlling for health status, the number of
acute, chronic, and well-care visits all increase with income. Phelps, supra note 16, at 130 tbl.5.7. This
demonstrates that the higher use of physician services at the lower end of the income scale is driven by
low-income persons’ worse health status, and it is reasonable to infer that public insurance is an
important factor in their being able to afford such higher use.
26. Among the nonelderly, 27.8% of those below 200% of poverty have Medicaid or state health
insurance coverage, and another 32.6% are uninsured. John Holahan & Allison Cook, Changes in
Economic Conditions and Health Insurance Coverage, 2000-2004, 2005 HEALTH AFF. (WEB
EXCLUSIVE) W5-498, W5-501 exhibit 2. Average Medicaid spending per capita for those in families (as
opposed to the elderly) was $2408 annually. John Holahan & Arunabh Ghosh, Understanding the
Recent Growth in Medicaid Spending, 2000-2003, 2005 HEALTH AFF. (WEB EXCLUSIVE) W5-52, W5-59
exhibit 6. In 2004, 45.8 million Americans were uninsured. DeNavas-Walt, supra note 12, at 18 tbl.7.
The uninsured received $40.7 billion in uncompensated care that year. Jack Hadley & John Holahan,
The Cost of Care for the Uninsured: What Do We Spend, Who Pays, and What Would Full Coverage
Add to Medical Spending?, Presentation Prepared for the Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the
Uninsured fig.5 (May 10, 2004) [hereinafter Hadley & Holahan, Presentation],
http://www.kaisernetwork.org/health_cast/uploaded_files/Hadley_and_Holahan_Slides.pdf.
The
average subsidized spending per uninsured in 2004 was nearly $900. Christopher J. Conover,
unpublished calculation (October 10, 2005) (on file with author) (based on data provided in DeNavasWalt, supra note 12, at 18 tbl.7, and Hadley & Holahan, Presentation, supra at fig.5). Thus, averaged
over the entire population of individuals below 200% of poverty, these subsidies amount to $959 per
capita. There is no plausible way for the regulatory costs related to physicians or other health
professionals to exceed this amount.
27. CAROL KANE, AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, PHYSICIAN MARKETPLACE REPORT:
PHYSICIAN PROVISION OF CHARITY CARE, 1988–1999 1 (2002), available at
http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/upload/mm/363/charity_care_2002.pdf.
28. For example, although their survey documents a decline in physician charity care, the
Community Tracking Survey shows that in 2004–2005, 68.2% of physicians provided some charity care
and averaged 10.6 hours per week on such activities. Peter J. Cunningham & Jessica H. May, A
Growing Hole in the Safety Net: Physician Charity Care Declines Again, TRACKING REP. NO. 13 (Ctr.
for Studying Health Sys. Change, Washington, D.C.), Mar. 2006, at 2 tbl.1, available at
http://www.hschange.com/CONTENT/826/826.pdf.
29. CONOVER, supra note 7, at 6 tbl.2.
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licensure ($8.6 billion), hospital uncompensated-care pools ($5.2 billion), and
the Clinical Laboratory Improvement Act (CLIA) of 198830 ($3.2 billion).31
A. Hospital Accreditation and Licensure
Whatever benefits of hospital quality regulation exist presumably redound
to the benefit of all patients. However, based on the well-established case from
Medicare that the appetite for technology and services rises with income,32 if
regulation improved overall hospital quality (a hornet’s-nest question avoided
here), a case certainly can be made that regulation would disproportionately
favor socioeconomically advantaged patients over those who are disadvantaged
on grounds that such patients would be more willing to pay for such
improvements. If quality regulation or entry regulations (such as Certificate of
Need on the hospital side) result in higher costs absorbed by all payers in the
form of what amounts to an excise tax, such a tax would be undeniably
regressive. However, it turns out that this tax is not nearly as regressive as the
pure head tax that Havighurst and Richman argue operates in the employer
health-insurance market.33 That is, taking into account amounts they pay out of
pocket as well as what they pay implicitly through private health insurance for
such services, the burden on poor families is three to four times as high as it is
for families at 400% of poverty or higher, as illustrated in Table 3. In contrast,
a head tax would result in more than an eight-fold difference in the relative
burden faced by poor versus well-to-do families.
34

Table 3: Hospital Tax is Less Regressive Than a
Head Tax
Family Income
as Percent of
Poverty

Lottery
(head tax)

Hospital
Tax

Physician
Tax

Average Burden per $10,000 Family
35
Income

Uninsured
Poor
Below Poverty

930
930

174
338

192
313

30. 42 U.S.C. § 263a (2000).
31. Id.
32. See generally Mark McClellan & Jonathan Skinner, The Incidence of Medicare, 90 J. PUB.
ECON. 257 (2006) (providing the most empirically grounded version of this thesis).
33. Havighurst & Richman, supra note 5, at 24.
34. CHRISTOPHER J. CONOVER & HESTER HAVERKAMP DAVIES, DUKE UNIVERSITY CENTER
FOR HEALTH POLICY, LAW AND MANAGEMENT, HEALTH CARE FOR THE MEDICALLY INDIGENT OF
SOUTH CAROLINA: FINAL REPORT (1998), available at http://www.hpolicy.duke.edu/cyberexchange/
states/pdf/CHAPTER1.PDF.
35. Figures account for all out-of-pocket spending and private-health-insurance premiums but
exclude incidence of financing Medicaid, Medicare, or other public programs.
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101-150%
151-200%
201-299%
300-399%
400% +

543
401
298
210
110

283
231
193
133
76

189

312
242
187
136
105

B. Hospital Uncompensated Care Pools
Analyzing hospital uncompensated-care pools is more complicated since in
this case the benefits of such pools are tilted unquestionably in favor of those at
the bottom. Thus, even if the gross costs of such pools are financed in the
fashion shown in Table 2, at best this would represent a small offset to the per
capita benefits of such pools for the poor as a group. Therefore, in terms of net
burden, this particular regulation seems unlikely to be regressively distributed,
although it is unquestionably more regressively distributed than if the “hidden
tax” of hospital cost-shifting were more neutrally borne. That said, not every
poor person utilizes hospital care in a year. (Among those with family incomes
below $15,000, fewer than one in seven experience a hospitalization in a typical
year).36 Thus, most with low incomes would experience a disproportionate
burden of financing uncompensated-care pools similar to that already described
for hospital accreditation and licensure.
C. Clinical Laboratory Improvement Act (CLIA)37
Although clinical laboratories themselves are facilities, any burdens of
regulation are ultimately borne by users of hospitals, nursing homes, and
outpatient health services. Hospital laboratories account for fewer than half of
all clinical laboratories.38 In a typical hospital, there is a higher mark-up on
ancillary services than on routine services such as per diem charges.39 Thus,
there is greater opportunity to discount pricing on laboratory services than on
other parts of a hospital bill. Although things are now beginning to change in

36. NAT’L CTR. FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, supra note 25, at 302 tbl.87.
37. 42 U.S.C. § 263a (2000). CLIA imposes uniform federal regulations designed to ensure a
minimal level of quality in clinical laboratories regardless of location; thus, CLIA covers not only
freestanding labs to which hospitals or physicians may send blood or other biological specimens for
testing, but also labs located in hospitals and physician offices. Even if quality regulation increases the
cost of lab tests by an equal percentage in all locations, for example 5%, the distributional
consequences may differ slightly based on how these higher costs are passed through to patients (which
in turn will depend on their payer status).
38. John T. Benjamin, The Effect of CLIA ‘88 and Managed Care on the Medical Lab Market,
MED. LABORATORY OBSERVER, Nov. 1996, at 54.
39. Barbara O. Wynn, Senior Health Policy Analyst, RAND, Inflation in Hospital Charges:
Implications for the California Workers’ Compensation Program, Testimony Presented to the
California Senate Labor and Industrial Relations Committee 2 (Jan. 15, 2003), available at
http://www.rand.org/pubs/testimonies/2005/CT202.pdf.
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light of recent media attention to the high prices paid by uninsured patients,40 on
average, any regressivity in the burden of financing hospital care in general
(Table 3) is likely to be even more exaggerated for hospital-provided lab
services. That is, any pass-through of laboratory regulatory costs is likely to be
amplified by the higher-than-average mark-ups used for such services.
Physician labs constitute approximately one in seven clinical laboratories.41
But as shown in Table 3, the distributional consequences of passing such costs
through physician services are nearly identical to the distributional effects of an
add-on to hospital service costs. That is, they are regressive.
V
OVERREGULATING HEALTH PLANS
The literature synthesis demonstrates that in the aggregate, various
regulations affecting health insurance imposed a cost of $99.3 billion annually
but conferred benefits whose value amounted to only $84.9 billion.42 The $14.4
billion in net costs was accounted for largely through continuation of coverage
requirements ($15.0 billion), benefits mandates ($13.5 billion), and managedcare patient-protection regulations ($3.2 billion).43
A. Continuation of Coverage Requirements
Probably the best-known continuation of coverage requirement is the
Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (COBRA) of 1985,44 which
requires employers with twenty or more employees that provide group health
insurance to provide employees and their families continued coverage if certain
events occur, such as loss of the employee’s job, the death of a covered
employee, or divorce.45 Because employers are permitted to charge employees
who take advantage of this continuation coverage a premium not to exceed
102% of the full premium for the cost of that plan,46 only one in six eligible
workers finds it worthwhile to purchase this coverage.47 Not surprisingly, those
electing to purchase the coverage have medical costs that exceed the (capped)

40. See Conrad Meier, Hospitals Face Pressure to Change Pricing Policies, HEALTH CARE NEWS
(Council for Affordable Health Ins., Alexandria, V.A.), Apr. 1, 2004 (noting potential changes in
response to recent news articles), http://www.cahi.org/article.asp?id=137.
41. Benjamin, supra note 38.
42. CONOVER, supra note 7, at 12 tbl.4.
43. Id. These three categories of regulation together greatly exceed the net cost of healthinsurance regulation because certain insurance regulations have net benefits (for example, healthprovider mandates have a net cost of -$12.2 billion) that offset net costs incurred in other areas of
health-insurance regulation. Id.
44. 31 U.S.C. § 6701 (2000).
45. See Brigitte C. Madrian, Health Insurance Portability: The Consequences of COBRA,
REGULATION, Winter 1998, at 27, 27–33 (more details about COBRA).
46. Id. at 27.
47. CHARLES D. SPENCER & ASSOCIATES INC., 2002 COBRA SURVEY (2002), reprinted in part in
MEDICAL BENEFITS, Oct. 15, 2002, at 5, 6 tbl.2 (showing 16.2% of eligible employees elected COBRA
coverage in 2002).
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premiums they are required to pay, resulting in a net subsidy that amounted to
$2491 per COBRA-covered individual in 2002.48
Thus, these regulations are doubly regressive: their benefits accrue
disproportionately to employees with high enough incomes to be able to afford
to pay full freight for their coverage. The costs of financing these subsidized
benefits are presumably allocated back to the general pool of employees. If this
is financed through the equivalent of a head tax (that is, equal premiums per
employee), the result is regressive; if employee contributions are fully adjusted
for in lower wages based on individual employees’ willingness to pay, then the
effect of financing this benefit is neutral, but the benefits would continue to be
regressively distributed, with the lion’s share going to the most well-off workers.
B. Benefits Mandates
Benefits mandates include minimum maternity stays following delivery,
mandatory breast-reconstruction surgery, mental-health parity requirements,
and similar requirements. There are a handful of federally imposed mandates,
including the first two listed in this paragraph,49 but the majority consist of the
more than fifty different benefits mandates that states have enacted during the
past half-century.50 It is certainly beyond the scope of this article to individually
analyze all these various mandates, but the federal mandates are probably
indicative of the types of political pressures that have led to the adoption of
various mandates. If patients were given a choice between the mandated
benefit and a payment equivalent to the additional cost to the system, it is a
reasonable presumption that low-income patients would be on average more
likely than higher-income patients to accept the payment in lieu of the
“benefit.”
So, as with the continuation of coverage requirements, benefits mandates
again appear to reflect a situation in which net benefits disproportionately
redound to those with high incomes—that is, the amount that high incomes are
“taxed” via the health plan to finance such benefits appears to be lower than
their willingness to pay for such benefits, with the opposite being true for lowwage workers. Even if we believe that health benefits in general are financed
through a hidden wage adjustment that fully compensates for the individual
worker’s willingness to pay for that benefit, it is difficult to imagine this
adjustment working in the case of many mandated benefits. Admittedly,
Jonathan Gruber found nearly full downward adjustment of wages for women
of child-bearing ages to offset the costs of maternity benefits,51 but it is difficult
48. Id. at 5.
49. GAIL A. JENSEN & MICHAEL A. MORRISEY, HEATLH INS. ASS’N OF AM., MANDATED
BENEFIT LAWS AND EMPLOYER-SPONSORED HEALTH INSURANCE, 5 (1999).
50. See VICTORIA CRAIG BUNCE, COUNCIL FOR AFFORDABLE HEALTH INS., HEALTH
INSURANCE MANDATES IN THE STATES 2004 4–5 (2004) (listing benefits mandates by state),
http://www.cahi.org/cahi_contents/resources/pdf/Mandatepub2004Electronic.pdf.
51. Jonathan Gruber, The Incidence of Mandated Maternity Benefits, 84 AM. ECON. REV. 622, 630–
31 (1994).
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to see how a similar adjustment would apply to benefits whose likelihood of
being used for any given employee might be microscopic. Thus, for most
employees, mandated benefits would appear to mirror the impacts described
earlier for continuation of coverage.
C. Managed Care Patient Protection
Managed care patient protections include “any-willing-provider laws,”
which require managed care organizations to accept any providers willing to
accept the plan’s terms; external review requirements that create a review
process for coverage denials that is independent of the health plan itself; and
patient-protection laws that hold health-maintenance organizations (HMOs)
liable for denial of coverage decisions.52 There is ample empirical evidence that
such regulation has had the net effect of increasing the cost of managed-care
plans.53 Evidence from Medicare suggests that those with the lowest and highest
incomes are least likely to enroll in HMOs.54 But like any excise tax, any acrossthe-board increase in managed care premiums resulting from such regulations
would have a regressive effect since the add-on to premiums would represent a
much larger share of income for those at the bottom of the income distribution
than at the top. Moreover, to the extent that such protections confer
procedural protections, they are far more likely to be taken advantage of by
better-educated, higher-income plan members than by those with the least
education and income. So again, we have a situation in which benefits are
skewed to the advantage of the well-to-do, and the burden of financing ends up
being borne regressively.
VI
CONCLUSION
Far more research undoubtedly can and should be done on the
distributional effects of the regulation of health professionals, health facilities,
and health insurance. But this brief excursion has largely supported the general
thesis proposed by Havighurst and Richman.55 Even though the healthfinancing system compresses rather remarkably the regressivity in financing that
would otherwise be observed, the net burden of financing remains regressive in
the aggregate. And when one examines the marginal impact of health
regulation on that broader picture, one could argue that the net effect on
balance is to make the system more, rather than less, regressive overall. In
cases in which the regressive effect of regulation is mitigated, this generally
52. See Frank A. Sloan & Mark A. Hall, Market Failures and the Evolution of State Managed Care,
65 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 169, 187–89 tbl.2 (Autumn 2002) (listing such laws).
53. CONOVER, supra note 7, at 14.
54. COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, U.S. CONGRESS. MEDICARE AND HEALTH CARE
CHARTBOOK 200 fig.4.20 (1997), available at http://www.gpo.gov/congress/house/ways-andmeans/sec4.pdf.
55. Havighurst & Richman, supra note 5, at 8.
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results from other aspects of policy (for example, public insurance) or the
behavior of providers (for example, charity care), rather than the requirements
of regulation itself. A good example of this is the impact of professional
licensure, which raises costs for all (which alone has a regressive impact) but
whose costs may be partially or fully offset (at least for some lucky low-income
patients) by programs such as Medicaid and charity care.
In many domains of regulation, a similar pattern emerges in which the
benefits of regulation were likely distributed in a fashion skewed towards those
with higher incomes and in which financing the added costs of regulation was at
best neutrally, but in many cases regressively, borne. This analysis has focused
on impacts purely from the standpoint of patients, that is, the “demand side.” If
the equation factors in the fact that much regulation results in higher incomes
for those in the health field and ancillary professions such as health lawyers,
then the regressive impact would be even worse than that described here.
Others may calculate more precisely what the net incidence of health-services
regulation might be, but I believe the picture painted herein provides a
reasonable approximation of what those more precise calculations will likely
find: a net impact of health services regulation that is regressively distributed.

